THE AGREEMENT reached between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush in Washington on July 18, 2005, on nuclear matters can be truly described as epochal. In the impact it could have on India's nuclear energy development, it stands on a par with the decisions taken on the Pokhran I test of 1974 and Pokhran II tests of 1998. Countries like human beings are normally comfortable with the old order continuing, they are averse to change, especially changes perceived by some to be fundamental. True, India could have gone on with the present situation of nuclear power making steady but slow growth based on Indian pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR), followed by development of the fast breeder reactor and the eventual use of the thorium. This path would mean a relatively small contribution of nuclear power, perhaps increasing from the present 3 per cent of total electric generation to a figure below 10 per cent, even after two or three more decades. Of course our nuclear deterrent capability would grow to a condition considered to be a `credible minimum.' India would continue to be isolated from global developments in nuclear energy technologies, both civilian and military.

In the United States, President Bush questioned the wisdom of shelving the nuclear power programme, which took place some 20 or more years ago. Public acceptance was seriously eroded following the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. During the past two decades, the 400-plus nuclear power units, in different countries, have been operating safely and reliably and producing power economical costs. Although new nuclear plant construction has not yet recommenced in the U.S., the Bush administration is actively encouraging the development of advanced reactor systems. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, as indeed his predecessor, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has realised the importance of nuclear energy as a part of the energy mix required to fuel the Indian economy, now poised to grow at 8 per cent per annum.

In 2002, the installed electrical capacity in the country was about 139 giga watts (one giga watt is 1,000 megawatts), inclusive of captive generation. The electricity production in 2002-2003 was about 639 terrawatt hours (TWH) of which 67 per cent came from coal-fired stations, 20 per cent from oil and gas, 10 per cent from hydro and 3 per cent from nuclear. Projections of India's requirements by 2052 indicate that the total installed capacity will have to be about 1,350 giga watts and the total generation about 8,000 terrawatt hours. Of this, the coal and hydrocarbon (oil and gas) contributions would have gone down to 47 and 16 per cent and hydro to 8 per cent. The nuclear component is required to go up to 26 per cent, produced by an installed capacity of about 275 giga watts, some 100 times the present operating capacity. This nuclear contribution is essential to contain emission of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide) and to cope with the ever-increasing prices of oil and gas, in the backdrop of rapidly declining global reserves.

At the G8 summit meeting held at Gleneagles in early July, while there was no agreement on accepting the Kyoto Protocol because of U.S. resistance, it endorsed development of nuclear and solar energy, hydrogen fuel cells and bio fuels. Of these, the presently available large-scale source is nuclear. The Indian nuclear energy programme initially had strong cooperation with the U.S. and Canada. But after the Pokhran tests of 1974 and 1998, it has grown on its own despite embargoes placed by the nuclear supplier countries. A wide range of research and development facilities, nuclear power stations and industrial establishments have been set up with a work force of over 50,000. The Prime Minister has leveraged this impressive strength to arrive at an agreement that promises to provide India access to civilian nuclear technology from the advanced countries.

The agreement recognises that India is a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and that it should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. India has, in turn, agreed as a reciprocal measure to identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner and file a declaration regarding the civilian facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency and place them voluntarily under its safeguards. It is clear that India has the right to decide which facilities and programmes it would like to identify as `civilian' for the purpose of this agreement and therefore place under safeguards. There has been a lively debate in the Indian media on whether separation of civilian and military facilities is easy or not. Some have held that it is very difficult or even impossible to do so; others opine it already exists. The truth is somewhere in between. Some time and costs will be involved to effect the separation, but the point to note is that the nuclear weapon countries have, over a period of time, achieved such separation. It is therefore not unreasonable for India to do likewise.

An issue that has agitated some sections of our scientific community is whether we could continue to develop the fast breeder reactor and thorium systems without the intrusive inspections that the IAEA may mount. Under the U.S.-India agreement, India can choose to keep the prototype fast breeder reactor outside the IAEA safeguards. Similarly it is open to India to keep the Babha Atomic Research Centre and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research either wholly or partly outside the inspection regime.

There has been some concern that the commitment to work with the U.S. on conclusion of a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty effectively caps our nuclear weapon programme. The FMCT is still many years away, given China's opposition. In any case, the plutonium contained in the spent fuel of our un-safeguarded reactors, prior to the entry into force of FMCT, when concluded, will be available to India for its strategic uses. The Prime Minister has rightly asserted that the agreement has in no way compromised the Indian nuclear deterrent.

President Bush has agreed to work with the U.S. Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India, and to work with its friends and allies in the Nuclear Supplies Group to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. It is well known that Russia and France are eager to supply light water reactors and low enriched uranium fuel for these reactors, as well as for the Tarapur reactors. India should immediately negotiate with Russia and France to import some ten 1000 MWe Light Water Reactors. In addition India should import natural uranium, in the form of yellow cake (i.e. U3O8) from global suppliers so that we could take up construction of some eight 700 MWe PHWR of our own design, which have been on the drawing boards for some time. India should also look for opportunities to acquire potential sites around the world where it can undertake uranium mining and beneficiation either wholly with Indian capital or on joint investment basis with the host country. In this manner, our nuclear power capacity, which is rather modest, can begin to grow fast and the groundwork can be laid for further growth in future.

Contrary to facts

Some commentators have implied that with access to technology from outside India, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India might as well shut down its `old technology inefficient units.' This is a damaging conclusion and contrary to all facts. The NPCIL units achieved operating factors in excess of 85 per cent a few years ago and had to be down-rated because of shortage of uranium. With larger quantities of uranium available at international prices, which are much lower than Indian prices, the operating costs of our older units will go down. As the Prime Minister has assured Parliament, India will continue the development of the pressurised heavy water reactors, fast breeder reactors and thorium systems as part of the national programme. Now India will also have the opportunity of joining the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and Generation 4 reactors, as foreseen in the agreement.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh deserves to be complimented for negotiating an agreement that can end India's nuclear isolation, without in any way compromising our security. Of course in the months ahead, there will be a lot of work to be done in the country and tough negotiations with our international partners. These negotiations cannot be left to diplomats and civil servants, but must be entrusted to acknowledged leaders in the nuclear field. The new agreement is both an opportunity and a challenge. India can, in due course of time, export nuclear hardware and services to an international nuclear market, which is bound to grow. Of course India must continue to work vigorously for universal nuclear disarmament, of which it has been a champion from the early days of the nuclear era.

(The writer is a former Chairman and presently member of the Atomic Energy Commission.)