There is bound to be a contentious
debate on the bargain struck by India and the United
States on nuclear energy cooperation and trade that is
the most substantive part of the Joint Statement
issued from Washington D.C. Unfortunately, this deal,
like so much else in the realm of strategic affairs
and foreign policy in recent years, including the
Indo-U.S. defence framework agreement, has been sprung
on the people of India — forsaking the method of
democratic discussion and consensus-building in
advance rather than after the deal is done. But the
substance of the Indo-U.S. nuclear bargain, which has
constructive potential for the non-military, peaceful
side of India's nuclear energy programme and offers
the prospect of the country coming out of its
post-1974 isolation in the international nuclear
energy arena, must not be missed in the name of
criticising the method.
Let us be clear about the nature
and specifics of the bargain. For a start, it is
conditional, with nothing guaranteed. It is also meant
to be worked in phases and holds some imponderables.
What precisely is on offer for India? It is obvious
that President George Bush has broken away from
long-term U.S. non-proliferation policy towards India.
Recognising it as "a responsible state with advanced
nuclear technology," he has committed himself to
working to achieve "full civil nuclear energy
cooperation with India as it realises its goals of
promoting nuclear power and achieving energy
security." Towards this end, he will seek agreement
from the U.S. Congress to adjust domestic laws and
policies. He will also work with friends and allies to
adjust restrictive international regimes so that India
can benefit from "full civil nuclear energy
cooperation and trade." The policy relaxation has
factored in "expeditious consideration of fuel
supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur."
What is the `price', the quid
pro quo, the United Progressive Alliance
Government has agreed to in the Joint Statement? Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh has committed India
"reciprocally" to segregating, "in a phased manner,"
the country's military and civilian nuclear
facilities; "voluntarily" placing its civilian nuclear
facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional
Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
continuing the "unilateral'' moratorium on nuclear
testing; working with the U.S. to help conclude a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty;
continuing with stringent non-proliferation export
control policies; and "harmonisation [with] and
adherence to" the guidelines of the Missile Technology
Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is
a formidable list of conditionalities accepted, but
some of them must be recognised as the product of the
interminable Jaswant-Talbott `dialogue' during the
six-year rule of the National Democratic Alliance
Government.
Is the deal a net gain or loss for
India? It is probably a loss from the standpoint of
the hawkish votaries of India's post-May 1998 nuclear
weaponisation, which derailed India's longstanding
policy and twisted out of shape its independent
character as well as its peace and disarmament
orientation. If the deal means "capping" dangerous
ambitions of developing India's so-called minimum
credible deterrent, that `loss' will clearly be to the
benefit of the people of India and the region. The
idea of `dual-using' the unsafeguarded heavy water
nuclear power reactors — actually 11 of 15 operational
reactors — to make bombs and, in the meantime,
generate power cost-efficiently, as a way of avoiding
unduly expensive stockpiling, is so completely
over-the-top as to qualify as Strangelovian. At a
practical level, while exploitation of the plutonium
produced by reprocessing the spent fuel of heavy water
reactors to make nuclear weapons is technically
feasible, the result will be low-yield, `dirty' bombs.
It is too much to believe that India will ever be in
need of such stuff for `deterrence' or `second strike'
or whatever.
In sum, the Manmohan-Bush nuclear
deal is to be understood as a constructive, although
clumsily non-transparent, preference exercised by the
UPA Government in favour of the civilian nuclear
programme. In the trade-off, the economist in Dr.
Singh seems to have come to the fore, although even
here not without controversy. The Mid-Term Appraisal
of the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) by the Planning
Commission presents a gloomy picture of the prospects
of stepping up the generation of nuclear energy, as
"an important tool for de-carbonising the Indian
energy sector," given the below-par performance. While
total installed nuclear power capacity remains as low
as 3310 Mwe (against an officially proclaimed target
of 10,000 Mwe for the end of the 20th century), the
Plant Load Factor for nuclear power plants has
actually declined over the past few years, "primarily
due to non-availability of nuclear fuel because the
development of domestic mines has not yet kept pace
with addition of generating capacity." If India can
forgo the option of nuclear power on a large scale,
there is no problem. However, if the country is
determined to expand, as it must, its civilian nuclear
power programme to a capacity of, say, 20,000 MWe and
then 30,000 MWe, there is no way of getting either
enriched or natural uranium fuel other than through a
quid pro quo arrangement that will enable the
Nuclear Suppliers Group to relax its stringent regime
and make a constructive exception for India. In fact,
the trade-off agreed to in the Joint Statement for a
resumption of full civilian nuclear cooperation and
trade is not radically different from the
supply-related safeguards accepted by India at four
operating nuclear power reactors. There is of course a
need to ensure that the country's independent research
activities oriented to peaceful purposes, including
the fast breeder programme, are not obstructed or
slowed down. The bigger worry is over the question of
whether there are hidden linkages — compromises
wrested from India in the realm of foreign and
security policies, for example, on the Iranian gas
pipeline or in the cooperation proposed in the global
`war against terrorism' — that go with the nuclear
deal. The other serious problem is that while
`non-proliferation' concerns figure in the Joint
Statement, the UPA Government has regrettably failed
to show the slightest interest in returning to India's
traditional policy of promoting nuclear disarmament on
the world stage. The Government owes it to the country
to provide clear and straightforward answers to these
caveats, breaking with the secretive manner in which
it did the nuclear deal.
