The nuclear deal with the United States by removing restrictions had opened up a huge opportunity and could lead to a quantum jump in the area of nuclear energy, according to official sources familiar with the negotiations.

In contrast to the target of 10,000 MW or the likely achievement of 6,500 to 7,000 MW from nuclear energy with a restrictive regime, it would be possible under the new agreement to go to 40,000 MW or even beyond to meet the energy needs in the medium term.

As regards India's obligations, they were clearly and unambiguously spelt out in the joint statement. Pointing to the wording that "India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States," the officials asserted that India's obligations were no more and no less than those assumed by the United States, France or any of the nuclear powers.

Referring to the U.S. description of India in the joint statement as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" rather than as a nuclear weapons state, the sources said while there was no reference to India as a nuclear weapons state explicitly, it was clear by implication in the text that India was looked upon as a nuclear weapons state and was to be given the same rights and expected to take on the same obligations. A formal recognition as a nuclear weapons state was not possible technically without an amendment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On the issues raised by experts in India that the agreement would cap nuclear weapons at the current levels and that it would hamper research, they said such fears were without basis and ran contrary to the clear language used in the agreement. It was India's own responsibility to identify and separate military and civilian facilities, and it was obliged to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency only the list of civilian facilities, not military facilities. It could keep any facility which might be needed for military purposes outside the list and the inspection regime. On the other hand, by voluntarily agreeing to place the civilian facilities under safeguards, it would gain access to nuclear technology, fuel and equipment from abroad.

The officials pointed out that India had always sought equality of treatment with the nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Under the agreement with the U.S., India's rights and obligations in civilian nuclear energy would be identical with those of the nuclear weapons states under the NPT while like in their case the military facilities would be outside any safeguards.

Room for negotiation

The language of the joint statement would allow India room to negotiate on specific issues. For instance, it speaks of signing and adhering to "an additional protocol" with respect to civilian nuclear facilities which may be different from the additional protocol that is commonly applied by the IAEA to non-nuclear states. The U.S. had negotiated a separate protocol for its civilian nuclear facilities. Again, it speaks of working with the U.S. for the conclusion of "a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty" and not the current text of the treaty over which both the U.S. and India had reservations. Under the circumstances, fears that India's production of fissile material would be frozen or that research would be hit were groundless.

The officials pointed out that from the American standpoint, President George Bush had taken a tremendous political risk and would have to spend considerable political capital to get the U.S. Congress and the other nuclear suppliers to go by the agreement on nuclear supplies to India.

Some sections of the strategic community in the U.S. would see it as undermining the whole edifice of the non-proliferation regime to accommodate one country. If he had taken on this formidable task, it was because of his vision of India as an emerging great power and his keenness to engage with it seriously in all areas.

Asked if in view of the difficult task ahead for Mr. Bush there could be a situation in which he would not be able to deliver but India would have taken on its obligations under the agreement, the sources said India's obligations were all reciprocal on the U.S. moving ahead with its commitments and not unilateral.

The text of the joint statement made it clear that India would "reciprocally agree" to assume the obligations and the task of identifying and separating military from civilian nuclear facilities and filing a declaration on its civilian facilities with the IAEA would be done in a "phased manner."

There was no likelihood of India tying its own hands in the event of the U.S. defaulting on its commitments.