India-US
Defence Pact - II: Commitments may fetter judgment
B. S. Raghavan
EVEN a quick once-over of the New Framework For The
US-India Defence Relationship signed on June 28 will make
clear that it goes far beyond the Agreed Minutes of 1995.
Otherwise, it is pointless to call it new.
Indeed, the text of the accord itself says that in the
context of the US-India Defence relationship having
"advanced in a short time to unprecedented levels of
cooperation unimaginable in 1995", and changes in the
international security environment posing challenges to both
countries "in ways unforeseen ten years ago", the new
"framework", while building on past successes is designed to
seize new opportunities by way of supporting the broader
US-India strategic partnership as an "element" of it. In
tune with its unprecedented nature, it will be in force for
an exceptionally long period of 10 years.
The blunt truth is that this is an agreement between two
unequal partners, one having all the trumps and the other in
danger of being irresistibly forced to follow suit at
moments of crisis. Also, be it noted that India has got very
little from the US for undertaking these obligations which
are bound to be a strain on its resources and freedom of
action. The US has been tight-lipped on India's bid for
permanent membership of the UN Security Council, supply of
dual use nuclear and space technologies and pressuring
Pakistan to close down sanctuaries for terrorists operating
against India. Well might the US Defence Secretary, Mr
Donald Rumsfeld, rejoice: "The military-to-military
relationship between our two countries is excellent. It has
been developed over a period of four-and-a-half years in
ways that today are multi-faceted. We have advanced
continuously in the relationship in terms of meetings and
exercises and various aspects of it. And I feel very good
about it and very positive about it."
"Shared
interests"
There are several features that distinguish the new
`framework' from the Agreed Minutes of 1995. For the first
time in a formal agreement, called by whatever name, on
Defence cooperation, it sets out the "shared interests" of
the US and India in specific terms as including: Maintaining
security and stability; defeating terrorism and violent
religious extremism; preventing the spread of weapons of
mass destruction and associated materials, data, and
technologies; and protecting the free flow of commerce via
land, air and sea lanes.
In the light of these wide-ranging goals, the two
Governments bind themselves and their Defence establishments
to a comprehensive charter of 13 (unlucky number!) different
types of obligations (see box) many of which may constrain
India to become a "client State" of the US.
Take, as examples, the obligations to collaborate "in
multinational operations when it is in their common
interest" and expand collaboration in missile defence.
Conceivably, the Defence Policy Group set up pursuant to the
Agreed Minutes of 1995 will decide what is in the common
interest of both countries, but what happens when they
cannot agree?
Further, there is no mention that such operations will be
under United Nations' auspices. Which means that India has
pre-committed itself to participating in them even if its
troops were to be brought under the US military command.
As regards missile Defence, the earlier part of the
article has already drawn attention to media reports (uncontradicted
so far) on talks going on for the induction of Patriot
Advance Capability-3 missile Defence system into India.
Collaboration in missile Defence can easily result in India
being drawn into the global missile defence shield being
forged by the US as part of its own hegemonistic strategy.
Would India want this to happen? Or, take the commitment to
"assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful
peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other
countries to field trained, capable forces for these
operations".
Peace-keeping cannot take place in vacuo or
without regard to who are the aggressors and the aggressed.
There will be situations in which it would be prudent for
India not to get involved. But the obligation imposed by the
charter is unqualified and may prove a source of contention.
Too
many cooks
On top of it all, India seems to have boxed itself in the
interlocking mechanisms envisaged under the "framework" and
they can also become embarrassing millstones round India's
neck in the future fettering free exercise of its judgment.
In addition to the existing Defence Policy Group and its
various sub-groups that came into being after the signing of
the Agreed Minutes, the pact "in recognition of the growing
breadth and depth of the US-India strategic defence
relationship" establishes a Defence Procurement and
Production Group (DPPG) and a Joint Working Group for
mid-year review of work.
The DPPG will oversee Defence trade, as well as prospects
for co-production and technology collaboration, broadening
the scope of its predecessor subgroup the Security
Cooperation Group.
The Defence Joint Working Group will be subordinate to
the Defence Policy Group and will meet at least once per
year to perform a mid-year review of work overseen by the
Defence Policy Group and its sub-groups (the Defence
Procurement and Production Group, the Joint Technical Group,
the Military Cooperation Group, and the Senior Technology
Security Group), and to prepare issues for the annual
meeting of the Defence Policy Group.
With so many cooks in the kitchen stirring the broth (and
the hornets' nests as well!), it is problematic whether
India's Defence establishment will have the time to look
after its primary duty of safeguarding India's own Defence!
In short, the whole purport of the "framework" and the
charter of commitments seem to be to enhance
"inter-operability" of which one of the concomitants would
be integration of the structures of the two armed forces. Is
India game for such a merger of identities?
(There are many foreign policy implications of the
framework impinging on India's relations with China and
South-Asian countries, which have not been touched on in
this article.)
Charter
of commitments under the `framework'
Conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges;
Collaborate in multinational operations when it is in
their common interest;
Strengthen the capabilities of our militaries to promote
security and defeat terrorism;
Expand interaction with other nations in ways that
promote regional and global peace and stability;
Enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction;
Expand two-way defence trade, not viewing defence
transactions, as ends in and of themselves, but as a means
to strengthen security, reinforce strategic partnership,
achieve greater interaction between armed forces, and build
greater understanding between Defence establishments;
In the context of Defence trade and a framework of
technology security safeguards, increase opportunities for
technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, and
research and development;
Expand collaboration relating to missile Defence;
Strengthen the abilities of our militaries to respond
quickly to disaster situations, including in combined
operations;
Assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct
successful peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling
other countries to field trained, capable forces for these
operations;
Conduct exchanges on Defence strategy and Defence
transformation;
Increase exchanges of intelligence; and
Continue strategic-level discussions by senior
leadership from the US Department of Defence and India's
Ministry of Defence, in which the two sides exchange
perspectives on international security issues of common
interest, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding,
promoting shared objectives, and developing common
approaches.
(Concluded)
Courtesy : Hindu Business Line Jul
14, 2005